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Available online 4 May 2016AbstractPurpose: Practicing medicine is a cognitively demanding task that consists of the ability to assess the patient, judge the nature of
his or her complaints, and make an appropriate diagnosis. A number of factors have the potential to affect the physician's
diagnostic performance negatively. Two of these factors are time pressure and case complexity. However, the empirical evidence
that supports this negative inﬂuence is scant. This study experimentally investigated the effect of time pressure and the complexity
of clinical cases on diagnostic accuracy.
Method: Thirty-seven senior internal medicine residents participated in this study. These residents were randomly allocated to two
experimental groups (with time pressure vs. without time pressure). These residents were instructed to diagnose 8 case scenarios (4
straightforward and 4 complex cases) presented on a computer by using E-Primes 2.0. The time pressure group received feedback
after each case that they were behind schedule, whereas the control group did not receive such information. The dependent
variables were the mean diagnostic accuracy and the mean processing time spent on each case during diagnosis.
Results: Participants under time pressure spent nearly the same time as the group without time pressure in diagnosing the clinical
cases. The diagnostic accuracy scores did not differ signiﬁcantly between the experimental and control group (F(1,35)¼0.07,
P¼0.79, and η2¼0.002). Conversely, a main effect of case complexity was found (F(1,35)¼203.19, Po0.001, and η2¼0.85).
Participants processed straightforward cases faster and more accurately compared with complex cases. No interaction was found
between time pressure and case complexity on diagnostic accuracy (F(1,35)¼0.003, P¼0.96, and η2o0.001).
Conclusions: Time pressure did not impact the diagnostic performance, whereas the complexity of the clinical case negatively
inﬂuenced the diagnostic accuracy. Further studies with the enhanced experimental manipulation of time pressure are needed to
reveal the effect of time pressure, if any, on a physician's diagnostic performance.
& 2016 King Saud bin AbdulAziz University for Health Sciences. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Physicians can make mistakes. According to a report by
the Institute of Medicine (IOM), 44,000–98,000 people die
each year in the United States alone as a result of medical
errors.1 These errors include medication mistakes, surgical
errors, the neglect of serious conditions, and diagnostic
errors which form a large part of such mistakes. It is
estimated that the death rate caused by the incorrect
diagnosis is higher than for any other type of medical
error.2,3 A Canadian study4 reported the incidence of
adverse events among hospitals and reported that 10.5%
of adverse events was related to diagnostic errors. In 2008,
Berner and Graber5 published an extensive review of
studies that focus on diagnostic error. The researchers
recognized that the diagnostic error rate in clinical
specialties is higher (a maximum of 10–15%) compared
with perceptual specialties such as radiology, dermatology,
and pathology (less than 5%). Understanding the etiology
of diagnostic error in clinical practice is important because
the causes of diagnostic errors involve both environmental
inﬂuences and cognitive factors.6
Practicing medicine is a cognitively demanding task
that requires the ability to assess a patient, to judge the
signiﬁcance of signs and symptoms, and to arrive at the
appropriate diagnosis. In certain clinical situations, these
tasks are not easily performed, particularly when under
time pressure. Physicians usually see, per visit, a high
volume of cases of varying difﬁculty level that need
diagnosis and treatment planning. Having to deal with
many cases, in a limited amount of time, exerts time
pressure on the physicians, which may eventually affect
the quality of care provided.7,8 Given that time pressure is
a reality in medical practice, and has been linked to stress,
fatigue, low job satisfaction, and suboptimal patient
care,9,10 it is important to investigate whether it also
has a negative effect on the diagnostic performance of a
physician.
Besides time pressure, the nature of the case has also an
important inﬂuence on the diagnostic reasoning process.
Studies have shown that the level of case difﬁculty
inﬂuences diagnostic reasoning and accuracy.11,12 It has
been found that complex cases often result in medical
error.13 Combining both conditions, time pressure may
hypothetically interact with case difﬁculty, exacerbating
the probability of error. This assumption has, however, not
been subjected to detailed investigation and requires further
testing.
In addition to the above, it is important to realize
that the diagnostic process involves a complex form ofthinking, referred to as clinical reasoning, which invol-
ves multiple levels of cognition and metacognition.14
According to Schmidt et al.15 ‘illness scripts’ play an
important role, which are mental representations of a
disease and develop from continuous exposure to similar
cases. Once an illness script is formed, it can be applied,
rather effortlessly, to treating new patients. This heuristic
process has been coined “non-analytical reasoning,”
whereas the diagnostic process involving systematic,
effortful analysis of a case is referred to as “analytical
reasoning” (or system 1 and system 2).16
It can be argued that when a physician is under time
pressure, he or she has to rely more on non-analytical
thinking because there is limited time for slow analytical
reasoning. This is particularly a problem if the case is
perceived as complex, that is, the physician does not have
a well-developed illness script and needs to fall back on
systematic analysis of the case.17 But even if the physician
has a developed illness script regarding the case at hand,
heuristics are sometimes prone to result in cognitive biases
and errors.18,19
To examine the extent of the potential issue of time
pressure and case complexity on the accuracy of medical
diagnoses, more studies are needed. The objective of the
present study is to explore the effect of time pressure and
case complexity, while diagnosing a clinical case, on
physicians' diagnostic accuracy. We hypothesized that
physicians under time pressure would spend less time in
diagnosing the cases than physicians without time
pressure, both for straightforward and for complex cases.
Moreover, we hypothesized that the more non-analytical
diagnostic mode would reduce the diagnostic accuracy
scores obtained by physicians under time pressure in
complex cases (but not in straightforward cases) in
comparison with physicians who do not experience time
pressure.2. Method
2.1. Design
The experiment employed a 2 2 experimental study,
with ‘time pressure’ (‘under time pressure’ vs. ‘without
time pressure’) as a between-subjects factor, and ‘case
complexity’ (straightforward cases vs. complex cases) as
within subject factor. The dependent variables were the
mean diagnostic accuracy scores and the mean response
time for each case. The ethical approval to conduct the
study was granted by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
Table 1
Diagnosis of the clinical cases used in the experiment.
Straightforward cases
1. Community acquired pneumonia
2. Acute pericarditis
3. Liver cirrhosis
4. Addison's disease
Complex cases
1. Thyrotoxicosis
2. Septic shock secondary to pneumonia with abdominal aortic
aneurysm rupture
3. Inﬂammatory bowel disease
4. Cushing syndrome secondary to small cell carcinoma
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Arabia.
2.2. Setting
An internal medicine residency training program in
Riyadh was chosen to recruit the research project's part-
icipants. This program is considered as one of the largest
programs in Saudi Arabia for training physicians. This
program is accredited and operated by the Saudi Commis-
sion for Health Specialties (SCFHS), which was estab-
lished in 1992.20 The program is divided into two stages:
junior residency of two years, named R1 and R2, and two
years of senior residency, called R3 and R4. Through the
program, the residents are exposed to a wide range of cases
that cover general internal medicine and all subspecialties.
The program also provides the residents with the chance to
be introduced to the related specialties of dermatology,
neurology, and diagnostic medical specialties.21
2.3. Participants
Thirty seven senior residents specializing in the internal
medicine training program offered by SCFHS (2011–
2012) in Riyadh were enrolled in this study. To maximize
the homogeneity of the study's population, the inclusion
criteria were: a) level of training: the residents were at stage
R3 or R4 of their training; and b) age: less than 35 years
old. Repeater residents were excluded from the study. The
estimated size of the population was 100 residents. The
sample was recruited from three main hospitals (King
Abdulaziz Medical City, King Khalid University Hospital,
and King Saud Medical City). The participants' involve-
ment was voluntary, and informed consent was obtained
from each resident. At the beginning of the study, we did
not disclose the full purpose of the study because this may
cause participants to think or act in ways ‘during solving
cases’ that would yield inaccurate data. However, at the
end of the study, both experimental and control participants
were debriefed regarding the true objective of the experi-
ment. Participants who completed the required task
received a small ﬁnancial incentive, which is equivalent
to one working hour in the local context.
2.4. Materials
Eight written clinical cases, four straightforward cases
and four complex cases were used for this research (see
Table 1). Each case consists of a brief description of a
patient's medical history, signs and symptoms, and the
results of the investigations. The cases were designated
into two categories based on their level of complexity: A)four straightforward cases, in that they represented pro-
blems frequently encountered by internal medicine resi-
dents. B) Four complex cases, in that they were
characterized by their uncommonness and rarely seen by
residents or may show an atypical presentation of diseases.
The cases were written by experts in internal medicine and
were used in previous research of which the data demon-
strated that the eight selected cases were indeed complex or
straightforward respectively.22,23
2.5. Procedure
This study was conducted over two months in a
computer lab with residents in hospitals. Each session
was 60 min long. The cases were presented to the
participants using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software
Tools, Inc. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). E-Prime is a pro-
gramming package for designing and running psychologi-
cal experiments.24 Upon arriving at the lab, residents were
randomly allocated, either to the “with time pressure”
experimental group or to the “without time pressure”
control group. This allocation was performed by assigning
participants alternatively to either group.
Each resident was seated in front of a computer screen
and signed the informed consent form. Then, the partici-
pants were instructed to log into the computer program and
work in silence without interruption. Upon logging in, the
program provided further instructions. The group under
time pressure was informed of the following by the initial
instructions provided by the computer program:
1. You have a set of clinical cases to diagnose.
2. The available time for diagnosis is short.
3. You will be informed after each case is diagnosed,
how much time remains and what proportion of the
complete task remains to be done.
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experiment by providing the participants with feedback
after each case, which was composed of two bars in
different colors: a green bar indicated the amount of time
remaining, and a red bar indicated the number of the cases
yet to be diagnosed. This feedback was independent of the
participants' performance and gave them the impression
that they are always behind schedule. Conversely, the
group without time pressure was informed that they had a
set of cases to be diagnosed and that the time allocated for
the task has been proved to be sufﬁcient.
Prior to the experiment, both groups were given two
example cases to get familiarized with the procedure.
The actual cases were presented to the participants in
random order. The software recorded the response time
for each case in seconds.
2.6. Analysis
The diagnoses provided by the participants were scored
by two experts in internal medicine in a blind (i.e., without
knowing the experimental condition under which the
responses were given) and independent (i.e., without
discussing with each other during the scoring) manner.
By following a standardized procedure,25,26 the diagnosis
was judged as accurately correct, partially correct/partially
incorrect or incorrect, receiving scores of 1, 0.5, and 0,
respectively. A diagnosis was considered correct when the
main component of the diagnosis (i.e., the main/core
diagnosis) appears in the diagnosis indicated by the
participant, for example: writing “Endocarditis” in the case
of acute bacterial endocarditis or “hepatitis” in the case of
acute viral hepatitis. A diagnosis was considered partially
correct/partially incorrect when one of the constituent
elements of the diagnosis appears in the diagnosis written
by the participant; however, the main diagnosis was not
cited. For example: writing “sepsis” as the diagnosis in the
case of “pneumonia with sepsis” or “Myopathy” as the
diagnosis in the case of “Hyperthyroidism”. A diagnosis
was considered incorrect when it did not correspond to the
main diagnosis, and none of its constituent elements
appears in the diagnosis written by the participant (that
means, it did not fall into one of the previously noted
categories). For example: writing “Acute myocardial
infarction” in the case of “Aortic dissection”. All statistical
analyses were performed using IBM SPSS version 20.0
(Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.).
A 2 2 repeated-measures ANOVA (signiﬁcance
level: P¼0.05) with the experimental condition (time
pressure vs. without time pressure) as a between-subjects
factor and case complexity (complex cases vs. straight-
forward cases) as a within-subjects factor was conductedon the mean diagnostic accuracy scores and the mean
response time obtained in the two experimental condi-
tions. This analysis tested the hypothesis that the time
pressure would reduce the diagnostic accuracy scores
obtained by the group under time pressure in complex
cases (but probably not in straightforward cases) in
comparison to the group without time pressure.
3. Results
Thirty-nine residents participated in this study. The
descriptive statistics revealed that there were two out-
liers for which the response time was signiﬁcantly
longer. One outlier was from the experimental group
during the solving of difﬁcult cases (mean response
time¼520 s) and one from the control group during the
solving of easy cases (mean response time¼343 s).
These data points are more than 1.5 interquartile ranges
(IQRs) above the third quartile. We believe these
values are considered as unusual response times, which
may affect the mean response time. Thus, we decided
to exclude them.
The remaining 37 participants (18 experimental and 19
control) exhibited the demographics presented in Table 2.
After randomization, both the experimental and control
groups did not show any signiﬁcant differences in age or
clinical practice.
3.1. Response time
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of
the response time of the straightforward and complex
cases for both experimental conditions.
A 2 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was performed
to test the effect of the time pressure (time pressure vs.
without time pressure) as between-subject factor and
the case complexity (complex vs. straightforward) as
within-subject factor and their interaction on response
time. The test revealed non-signiﬁcant differences of
time pressure on response time (F(1,35)¼0.72,
P¼0.40, η2¼0.02). However, a large signiﬁcant effect
was found for case complexity on response time (F
(1,35)¼114.36, Po0.001, and η2¼0.77). Straightfor-
ward cases were diagnosed more rapidly than complex
ones. This outcome constitutes supportive evidence for
the validity of the difﬁculty level of the chosen cases.
There was no signiﬁcant interaction effect of time
pressure and case complexity on response time (F
(1,35)¼0.04, P¼0.85, η2¼0.001). Participants under
time pressure diagnosed the cases with nearly the same
speed as the group that was not under time pressure for
both the straightforward and complex cases.
Table 2
Demographic information for both groups.
Conditions Demographic features Values
Experimental group
(Under time pressure)
Number of subjects 18
Age mean in years (range) 29.3 (26–
40)
Missing data:3
Gender
M 12
F 6
Clinical practice mean in
years, (range)
3.9 (1–12)
Control group(Without
time pressure)
Number of subjects 19
Age mean in years (range) 28.6 (27–
33)
Missing data:1
Gender
M 14
F 5
Clinical practice mean in
years (range)
3.6 (2–7)
Table 3
Means and standard deviations obtained for response time (in
seconds) during diagnosis of the clinical cases as a function of case
complexity and experimental condition.
Under time pressure
(Experimental)
Without time
pressure (Control)
n mean SD n mean SD
Straightforward 18 97.24 33.71 19 107.62 35.17
Complex 18 191.2 69.11 19 205.02 58.09
Table 4
Means and standard deviations obtained for means of accurate
diagnosis as a function of case complexity and experimental
condition.
Under time pressure
(Experimental)
Without time
pressure (Control)
n mean SD n mean SD
Straightforward 18 0.80 0.16 19 0.81 0.11
Complex 18 0.25 0.18 19 0.26 0.21
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Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of the
accurate diagnosis generated for the straightforward and
complex cases under the two experimental conditions.
A 2 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was performed to
test the effect of the time pressure (time pressure vs.
without time pressure) as between-subject factor and the
case complexity (complex vs. straightforward) as within-
subject factor and their interaction on diagnostic acc-
uracy. The results revealed that there was no signiﬁcant
between-subjects effect of time pressure on diagnostic
accuracy (F(1,35)¼0.07, Po0.79 and η2¼0.002). How-
ever, the results also revealed a signiﬁcant within-subject
effect of case complexity on the diagnostic accuracy (F
(1,35)¼203.19, Po0.001, η2¼0.85); which suggests that
case difﬁculty signiﬁcantly affected the diagnostic accu-
racy. Finally, there was no signiﬁcant interaction effect oftime pressure and case complexity on diagnostic accuracy
(F(1,35)¼0.003, P¼0.96, η2o0.001).4. Discussion
In this study, we investigated the effect of time pressure
and case complexity on the diagnostic performance of
physicians. We hypothesized that, when doctors perform
under time pressure, their diagnostic skills would be
negatively affected when dealing with complex cases but
not when dealing with straightforward cases. The assump-
tion is that the induced time pressure would limit the time
available to process information through deliberate analy-
tical reasoning,27 making the participant more depend on
non-analytical, heuristic reasoning to process the case.
Thus, physicians would spend less time and commit more
diagnostic errors, particularly with complex cases. To test
these assumptions, we conducted an experiment involving
senior internal medicine residents. Straightforward and
complex cases were diagnosed under time pressure or
without time pressure.
Contrary to our prediction, the results suggest that
doctors produced similar diagnostic accuracy scores under
time pressure and without time pressure. Although there
was not a signiﬁcant difference between the two groups in
terms of diagnostic accuracy, our results revealed large
signiﬁcant differences in terms of the complexity of the
case. Participants spent more time—nearly twice as much
—on diagnosing complex cases compared with straightfor-
ward ones. Apparently, complex problems presented
uncommon features, which needed more exploration and
elaboration associated with reﬂective practice (analytical
reasoning) in medicine.28 Conversely, straightforward
cases were processed faster because they presented familiar
features. This ﬁnding is consistent with those of Mamede
et al.22 who found that case ambiguity affected the
diagnostic reasoning of internal medicine residents.
Another study found that task difﬁculty activated reﬂection
and therefore has an inﬂuence on the reasoning strategies
used.29 Interestingly, although complex cases took a longer
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it did not necessarily improve the diagnostic accuracy.
Most of the complex cases were not diagnosed accurately
by the participants. For instance, the “septic shock seco-
ndary to pneumonia” case was only diagnosed correctly by
one participant. This was despite the fact that our residents
were senior; some were even eligible to take the certifying
board exam. This result suggests that the time available to
generate a diagnosis is not the only factor that may have
impacted the diagnostic reasoning process. It appears that
the level of expertise, and thus knowledge (i.e., availability
of illness scripts) is a crucial factor in generating a correct
diagnosis.6,27 In other words, if cases are complex and thus
knowledge is lacking, no matter how much more time was
spent on reasoning about them, it did not result in a correct
diagnosis because the knowledge is missing to deal with
the cases.13,23,30
Overall, our ﬁnding that there was no signiﬁcant
effect of the treatment on response time nor diagnostic
accuracy can mean two things. First, it is possible that
time pressure has no signiﬁcant effect on diagnostic
reasoning. This would be in line with the conclusions
by Norman and colleagues. Norman et al. divided
second year internal medicine participants into two
groups and requested that they diagnose 20 clinical
cases; one group was requested to be fast but accurate,
and the second group was requested to be slow and
careful.31 The researchers found no difference in
diagnostic accuracy between the two groups.
A second possibility is that the experimental manipula-
tion was too subtle to cause any signiﬁcant effect of time
pressure on diagnostic performance. The mean difference
in response time between both conditions was non-
signiﬁcant and a meager 12 s. This may be too little to
cause sufﬁcient “damage” to the diagnostic reasoning
process. As such, the instructions may have not been
sufﬁciently clear with regard to the limited time available
for the entire session and the emphasis on being quick.
Although we used two colored bars to visually convey the
message that the participants were behind schedule, this
visual cue may have been insufﬁcient to result in working
faster. This is a limitation of the study. For future studies, it
may be more effective to provide additional negative
feedback to help the participants interpret the status of
the time and progress bars. Providing additional negative
feedback, which is independent of the actual progress, is
something that needs further investigation.
Funding/Support
King Abdullah International Medical Research Center
(KAIMRC) (Grant no: RC10/122) funded this study.Other disclosures
None.
Ethical approval
This study received ethical approval (RC10/122) from
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the National
Guard Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Previous presentations
None.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the program directors
and residents of internal medicine residency program on
the following hospitals: King Abdulaziz Medical City,
King Khalid University Hospital, King Saud Medical City.
References
1. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Washington
D.C.: National Academies Press; 2000.
2. Leape LL, Brennan TA, Laird, N, et al. The nature of adverse
events in hospitalized patients. Results of the Harvard Medical
Practice Study II. N Engl J Med. 1991;324(6):377–384.
3. Thomas EJ, Studdert DM, Burstin, HR, et al. Incidence and
types of adverse events and negligent care in Utah and Colorado.
Med Care. 2000;38(3):261–271.
4. Baker GR, Norton PG, Flintoft, V, et al. The Canadian adverse
events study: the incidence of adverse events among hospital
patients in Canada. Can Med Assoc J¼J l’Assoc Med Can.
2004;170(11):1678–1686.
5. Berner ES, Graber ML. Overconﬁdence as a cause of diagnostic
error in medicine. Am J Med. 2008;121(5 Suppl):S2–23.
6. Graber ML, Franklin N, Gordon R. Diagnostic error in internal
medicine. Arch Intern Med. 2005;165(13):1493–1499.
7. Linzer M, Gerrity M, Douglas JA, McMurray JE, Williams ES,
Konrad TR. Physician stress: results from the physician worklife
study. Stress Health. 2002;18(1):37–42.
8. Wetterneck TB, Linzer M, McMurray, JE, et al. Worklife and
satisfaction of general internists. Arch Intern Med. 2002;162(6):
649–656.
9. Bovier PA, Perneger TV. Predictors of work satisfaction among
physicians. Eur J Public Health. 2003;13(4):299–305.
10. Spickard JA. MId-career burnout in generalist and specialist
physicians. JAMA: J Am Med Assoc. 2002;288(12):1447–1450.
11. Mamede S, Schmidt HG, Rikers R. Diagnostic errors and
reﬂective practice in medicine. J Eval Clin Pract. 2007;13(1):
138–145.
12. Mamede S, Schmidt HG, RMJP Rikers, Penaforte JC, Coelho-
Filho JM. Inﬂuence of perceived difﬁculty of cases on physi-
cians' diagnostic reasoning. Acad Med J Assoc Am Med Coll.
2008;83(12):1210–1216.
D.A. ALQahtani et al. / Health Professions Education 2 (2016) 99–105 10513. Jacobs S, O’Beirne M, Derﬁingher LP, Vlach L, Rosser W,
Drummond N. Errors and adverse events in family medicine.
Can Fam Physician. 2007;53(2):270–276.
14. Simmons B. Clinical reasoning: concept analysis. J Adv Nurs.
2010;66(5):1151–1158.
15. Schmidt HG, Norman GR, Boshuizen HP. A cognitive perspec-
tive on medical expertise: theory and implication. Acad Med J
Assoc Am Med Coll. 1990;65(10):611–621.
16. Norman G. Research in clinical reasoning: past history and
current trends. Med Educ. 2005;39(4):418–427.
17. Evans JSBT, Handley SJ, Bacon AM. Reasoning under time
pressure. A study of causal conditional inference. Exp Psychol.
2009;56(2):77–83.
18. Evans JSBT, Curtis-Holmes J. Rapid responding increases belief
bias: evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning. Think
Reason. 2005;11(4):382–389.
19. De Neys W. Dual processing in reasoning: two systems but one
reasoner. Psychol Sci. 2006;17(5):428–433.
20. SCFHS-Postgrduate Programs. Available at: 〈http://www.scfhs.
org.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx〉; Accessed 14.01.16.
21. SCFHS-Program Manual of Internal Medicine Residency Train-
ing Program. Available at: 〈〈http://www.scfhs.org.sa/en/MESPS/
TrainingProgs/TrainingProgsStatement/InternalMedicine/Pages/
ProgBook.aspx〉; Accessed 14.01.16.
22. Mamede S, Schmidt HG, Rikers RMJP, Penaforte JC, Coelho-
Filho JM. Breaking down automaticity: case ambiguity and the
shift to reﬂective approaches in clinical reasoning. Med Educ.
2007;41(12):1185. 192.
23. Mamede S, Schmidt HG, Penaforte JC. Effects of reﬂective
practice on the accuracy of medical diagnoses. Med Educ.
2008;42(5):468–475.24. Hairston WD, Maldjian JA. An adaptive staircase procedure for
the E-Prime programming environment. Comput Methods Pro-
grams Biomed. 2009;93(1):104–108.
25. Mamede S, Schmidt HG, RMJP Rikers, EJFM Custers, TAW
Splinter, van Saase JLCM. Conscious thought beats deliberation
without attention in diagnostic decision-making: at least when
you are an expert. Psychol Res. 2010;74(6):692.
26. Mamede S, van Gog T, van den Berge, K, et al. Effect of
availability bias and reﬂective reasoning on diagnostic accuracy
among internal medicine residents. JAMA. 2010;304(11):
1198–1203.
27. Evans JSBT. The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: exten-
sion and evaluation. Psychon Bull Rev. 2006;13(3):378–395.
28. Mamede S, Schmidt HG. The structure of reﬂective practice in
medicine. Med Educ. 2004;38(12):1302–1308.
29. Heemskerk L, Norman G, Chou S, Mintz M, Mandin H,
McLaughlin K. The effect of question format and task difﬁculty
on reasoning strategies and diagnostic performance in internal
medicine residents. Adv Health Sci Educ Theory Pract. 2008;13
(4):453–462.
30. Weinberg NS, Stason WB. Managing quality in hospital practice.
Int J Qual Health Care: J Int Soc Qual Health Care/ISQua.
1998;10(4):295–302.
31. Norman G, Sherbino J, Dore, K, et al. The etiology of diagnostic
errors: a controlled trial of system 1 versus system 2 reasoning.
Acad Med. 2014;89(2):277–284.
